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ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK: VASQUEZ v.
HA WTHORNE WRONGLY DENIED WASHINGTON'S
MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE TO SAMESEX COUPLES
Amanda J. Beane
Abstract: Washington's property-division scheme for unmarried couples is among the
most progressive in the nation. The scheme has evolved from a time when courts treated
unmarried couples unfavorably and generally refused to divide their property equitably. The
Washington Supreme Court took a step forward from this approach when it created the
meretricious relationship doctrine. Under this doctrine, courts may equitably divide
unmarried couples' property at the termination of their relationship if the relationship was
stable, marital-like, and the parties cohabited knowing they were not lawfully married. Now,
however, the Washington Court of Appeals has restricted the application of this doctrine to
heterosexual couples only, holding in Vasquez v. Hawthorne that same-sex relationships
cannot qualify as meretricious relationships. Vasquez reasoned that because Washington law

prevents same-sex couples from marrying, same-sex relationships cannot be "marital-like."
The Washington Supreme Court has granted review and should reverse Vasquez. "Maritallike" has been and should be defined by the conduct of the parties and not by their legal
status. The Vasquez decision unjustly denies to same-sex couples an opportunity to benefit
from a property-division scheme for unmarried couples by violating public policy and

reflecting heterosexist views.

Until recently, Washington courts had treated unmarried couples
unfavorably. The presumption governing property division, known as
the Creasman presumption, provided that property acquired by an
unmarried couple belonged solely to the one who held title.'
Recognizing the unfairness of this outcome, courts created certain
exceptions to the Creasman presumption, 2 until the Washington
Supreme Court overruled the presumption in 1984 and created the
meretricious relationship doctrine.3
Under the meretricious relationship doctrine, unmarried couples may
take advantage of the community property scheme for married couples.4
For example, a woman who sacrificed her career, worked in the home,
and helped with the family business, but who never married her male
1. Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 351, 196 P.2d 835, 838 (1948).
2. E.g., Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 553-54, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1976).
3. In re Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 304, 678 P.2d 328,331 (1984).
4. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 351, 898 P.2d 831, 836-37 (1995). The term
meretricious has a "demeaning connotation" but conveys a "specific legal meaning." Id. at 343 n. 1,
898 P.2d at 832 n.l.
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partner, would have a claim for her share of the house, business, and
other assets should the relationship end by separation or death. The
woman would have to prove that she and her male partner were involved
in a meretricious relationship: a stable, marital-like relationship where
the partners cohabited knowing they were not lawfully married. 5
A man, however, who also worked in the home and helped with the
business, could not currently make the same claim should his
relationship with his male partner dissolve. In Vasquez v. Hawthorne,6
the Washington Court of Appeals held that same-sex relationships
cannot be meretricious relationships as a matter of law.' The court held
that because the Washington statute on prohibited marriages bars samesex couples from marrying,8 same-sex relationships cannot be maritallike.9 Thus, same-sex relationships fail to qualify under a key element of
the meretricious relationship doctrine.' 0 The court's ruling denied Frank
Vasquez his share of the estate he acquired with his male partner of
twenty-eight years."
The Washington Supreme Court should reverse Vasquez. The
Washington Court of Appeals should have followed Washington
precedent and defined "marital-like" in relation to the conduct of the
2
couple involved instead of deferring to an unrelated marriage statute.'
The court confused marital-like conduct with marital-like status,
ignoring that same-sex couples can and do engage in marital-like
conduct and denying to Frank Vasquez what a Washington court would
have granted to a woman in his place. The court also incorrectly applied
marriage legislation to a property-division doctrine for unmarried
couples and ignored the intent and purpose of the meretricious
relationship doctrine.
In addition to being legally incorrect, the Vasquez decision reflects
bad public policy and heterosexist bias. The Vasquez court violated
public policy by deviating from just application of the law, the fair
application of remedies, and the purpose underlying the meretricious

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.
99 Wash. App. 363, 994 P.2d 240, review granted, 141 Wash. 2d 1025, 11 P.3d 825 (2000).
Id. at 364, 994 P.2d at 241.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(I)(c) (2000).
Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 367-68, 994 P.2d at 242-43.

10. See id.

11. See id. at 364-65, 994 P.2d at 241.
12. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(c).
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relationship doctrine. Finally, the Vasquez decision is heterosexist
because it assumes that because same-sex couples may not enjoy marital
status, they do not engage in marital-like relationships.
Part I of this Note explains the property rights of married, unmarried,
and same-sex couples in Washington. Part II addresses the application of
the meretricious relationship test since its development. Part I
discusses the facts, procedural background, and the court's opinion in
Vasquez v. Hawthorne. Part IV argues that "marital-like" should be
defined by conduct and not by legal status. Part V argues that Vasquez
both violates public policy and is heterosexist. This Note concludes that
Vasquez is a regressive, unjust step in Washington's property-division
scheme for unmarried couples and should be reversed.
I.

THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MARRIED, UNMARRIED, AND
SAME-SEX COUPLES IN WASHINGTON

Washington's property-distribution scheme differs for married
couples, unmarried heterosexual couples, and, after Vasquez, unmarried
same-sex couples. Because Washington is a community property state,
property of married couples is managed, characterized, and distributed
according to principles of equality between husband and wife. For
unmarried couples, courts may apply community property principles to
the distribution of property at the termination of the relationship under
the meretricious relationship doctrine." Property division at the end of a
relationship that does not qualify as a meretricious relationship is
dependent on contract, partnership and restitution remedies. Because
same-sex couples may not marry,'" the Vasquez decision bars the only
access same-sex couples have to community property principles.
A.

MarriedCouples' PropertyRights Are Protectedby Washington s
Statutory Community PropertyRegime

When a couple marries in satisfaction of the requirements of the
Washington marriage statutes," the couple's legal status automatically
13. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 351, 898 P.2d 831, 836-37 (1995); In re Lindsey,
101 Wash. 2d 299,304,678 P.2d 328,331 (1984).
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(c).
15. Id. § 26.04.0 10 (stating marriage where husband or wife has not attained seventeen years of
age is void except on showing of necessity); id. § 26.04.020 (stating marriage prohibited when
either party has husband or wife living at time of marriage, husband and wife are of nearer relations

Washington Law Review

Vol. 76:475, 2001

16
enables each individual to claim community property rights. Community property rests on the presumption that the marital relationship is
analogous to a partnership, with each spouse equally contributing to and
benefiting from the marriage. 7 Washington is one of nine states that
apply community property principles regarding the characterization,8
management, and disposition of property acquired during a marriage.
Washington statutes define community property and separate property,
and, with the common law, govem the distribution of all property at the
end of the marital relationship.
Washington statutory law labels community property as that property
acquired during marriage by labor, industry, or other valuable
consideration. 9 In Washington, courts presume that property acquired
during the marriage is community property," although each spouse may
own property separately. 2' Each spouse has equal management power
over the community property and has testamentary 2 power over his or
her half of the community property. 3
Washington statutes define separate property as property acquired by
gift, succession, inheritance, or other nonvaluable means.24 The Washington Supreme Court has also held that proceeds from a personal-injury
action are separate property.25 Each spouse may manage his or her
separate property as he or she desires. 26
Statutory schemes and common law govern the disposition of
community property and separate property in the event of dissolution or

than second cousin, or parties are other than male and female); id. § 26.04.160 (describing license
and oath requirements for marriage).
16. Id. § 26.16.030.
17. Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington (Revised 1985), 61 WASH. L.
REV. 13, 17-18 (1986); see, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 840 (1997) (noting that
community property "is a commitment to the equality of husband and wife and reflects the real
partnership inherent in the marital relationship").
18. Cross, supra note 17, at 17 n.3. The other community property states are Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
19. Id. at 27-28.
20. Id. at 28.
21. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010-.020; Cross, supra note 17, at 19.
22. "Testamentary" is defined as relating to a will or testament. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1484 (7th ed. 1999).
23. Cross, supra note 17, at 18-19, 92.
24. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010-.020; Cross, supra note 17, at 27.
25. In re Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 730, 675 P.2d 1207, 1208 (1984).
26. Cross, supra note 17, at 19.

Vasquez v. Hawthorne
death. In marital dissolution, courts convert community property to
separate property because the marital community ceases to exist, and
then make a just and equitable distribution.' If one spouse dies
intestate," the surviving spouse takes the decedent's one-half share of
community property and retains his or her own one-half share. 9
Furthermore, the surviving spouse takes the entire separate estate of the
decedent spouse if that spouse has no surviving children, siblings, or
parents,3" one-half of the separate estate if that spouse has surviving
children,3 and three-quarters of the separate estate if that spouse has no
offspring but has surviving parents or siblings. 2
B.

Cohabiting,UnmarriedCouples' PropertyRights Are Protectedby
Washington Courts Through the MeretriciousRelationship
Doctrine

Property distribution for cohabiting, unmarried couples in Washington has evolved over the last two decades from a rigid rule to an
equitable approach. Historically, courts had held that property acquired
by an unmarried couple belonged only to the one who held title.33
Although both in Washington34 and elsewhere3 5 courts developed
various exceptions to the law, the Washington Supreme Court did not
overturn the rule until 1984, when it created the meretricious
relationship doctrine.36 That doctrine, further developed in 1995," 7
dictates that parties to a stable, marital-like relationship who cohabit
knowing they are not lawfully married may have their property justly
and equitably distributed at the end of the relationship.

27. Id. at 113.
28. Intestacy occurs when one dies without a will. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 827 (7th ed.
1999).
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015(1)(a) (2000); Cross, supra note 17, at 92.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § I1.04.015(l)(d).
31. Id. § l 1.04.015(1)(b).
32 Id. § I 1.04.015(1)(c).
33. Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 351, 196 P.2d 835, 838 (1948).
34. Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 553-54, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1976); infra notes
44-51 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976).
36. In re Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 304, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (1984).
37. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 348, 898 P.2d 831, 835 (1995).
38. Id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 835-36.

479
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The Creasman Presumption:PartiesMust Have Intended To
Disposeof Their PropertyAs They Actually Did

Before 1984, the Creasmanpresumption governed the property rights
of cohabiting, unmarried couples in Washington. In Creasman v.
Boyle,39 the Washington Supreme Court stated that the parties must have
intended to dispose of their property as they actually did, such that
property acquired by an unmarried couple belonged to the one who held
legal title. 40 The Creasman presumption disregarded contributions a
party may have made to the acquisition of property. This holding may
have been motivated by something other than property equity: Harvey
Creasman was an African-American man living with a white woman,
Caroline Paul. 4' Although Creasman earned the money for the home he
and Paul shared, the couple held title in Paul's name only and made
mortgage payments in Paul's name.42 When Paul died intestate, the court
awarded the home to her estate-not Creasman.43
Washington courts devised exceptions to the Creasman presumption
in order to divide equitably property acquired during an unmarried
couple's relationship. 44 Situations qualifying for an exception included
those where one or both parties entered a marriage in good faith that
later proved to be void 45 or where the title to property acquired during
cohabitation could be traced to the separate property of one or both
parties.46 Alternate theories also provided for equitable division of
property acquired during marital-like cohabitation, such as joint
venture, 47 implied partnership, 48 resulting trusts, 49 and tenancy in com39. 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
40. Id. at 356, 196 P.2d at 840-41.
41. At the very least, the holding ignored the social realities that may have discouraged an
interracial marriage and kept the property in the white woman's name. For instance, in 1967,
seventeen states still had anti-miscegenation laws. Denise C. Morgan, Jack Johnson: Reluctant
Hero of the Black Community, 32 AKRON L. REV 529, 544 n.58 (1999). The U.S Supreme Court
invalidated such statutes in 1967. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
42. Creasman, 31 Wash. 2d at 345-50, 196 P.2d at 836-38.
43. Id. at 358, 196 P.2d at 842.
44. See, e.g., Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 553-54, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1976).
45. Creasman, 31 Wash. 2d at 352, 196 P.2d at 838-39.
46. Shull v. Shepherd, 63 Wash. 2d 503, 507, 387 P.2d 767, 769-70 (1963); West v. Knowles,
50 Wash. 2d 311, 313, 311 P.2d 689, 691 (1957) (holding property acquired by both parties and
held as tenants in common to be divided proportionally where separate property could be traced,
otherwise divided equally).
47. In re Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 75, 499 P.2d 864, 865 (1972) (finding joint venture or
implied partnership where woman contributed to success of business); Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash.
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mon.5 ° Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court limited Creasman
to its facts, where one party had died and the other was prohibited from
testifying regarding the intent of the relationship because of the Dead
Man's Statute.5'
2.

Marvin v. Marvin: The CaliforniaSupreme Court Recognizes the
PropertyRights of UnmarriedCouples

In 1976, California became the first state to recognize the property
rights of unmarried couples. In California, as in Washington, courts
historically looked unfavorably on cohabiting parties who sued for a
share in property acquired during the relationship.5 2 The California
Supreme Court, however, recognized in Marvin v. Marvin53 the increasing number of couples living together without marrying54 and
determined that agreements between nonmarital partners should be

2d 558, 564-65, 236 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (1951) (finding joint venture or implied partnership
where woman contributed money and labor to business and made house payments from profits). A
joint venture is a business undertaking by two or more people. See, e.g., id. at 564-65, 236 P.2d at
1048-49.
48. Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d at 73, 499 P.2d at 864-65; Poole, 39 Wash. 2d at 565, 236 P.2d at
1049. An implied partnership is a partnership implied by law when the actions and conduct of the
parties demonstrate that they entered into a business relationship involving some combination of
property, labor, skill, and experience. Thornton, 81 Wash. 23 at 79,499 P.2d at 687-68.
49. Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 812-13, 232 P.2d 827, 829-30 (1951) (holding that
Walberg owned property where evidence showed that Mattson only held title to avoid
complications with Walberg's estranged spouse and that Walberg had contributed nearly all of
money for purchase of property). A court imposes a resulting trust when one party transferred
property under circumstances implying the party did not intend for the transferee to retain legal
title to the property. See, e.g., id. at 812, 816, 232 P.2d at 829, 831. Compare a resulting trust to a
"constructive trust," where a court imposes a trust on equitable grounds against one who obtained
the property by wrongdoing. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1514 (7th ed. 1999).
50. Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wash. 2d 627, 631, 305 P.2d 805, 807 (1957) (holding that property
acquired by both parties and held as tenants in common should be divided proportionally where
separate property can be traced, otherwise divided equally). A tenancy in common is a tenancy
shared by two or more persons in equal or unequal undivided shares with each having a right to
possess the entire property but no right of survivorship. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1478 (7th ed.
1999).
51. In re Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 302, 678 P.2d 328, 330 (1984). Washington's Dead Man's
Statute is codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.030 (2000), which excludes testimony by an
interested party regarding transactions with deceased, incompetent, or disabled persons. Id.
52. Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for UnmarriedCouples Dependent
Upon Sexual Orientation?,33 IND. L. REv. 991, 993 (2000).
53. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
54. Id. at 109.
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enforced unless the contract is founded explicitly on consideration for
sexual services."
The Washington Supreme Court Overruled Creasman and
Developed the MeretriciousRelationship Doctrine

3.

Eight years after Marvin, the Washington Supreme Court expressly
overruled Creasman and replaced the Creasmanpresumption with a new
theory. Under In re Lindsey, 6 courts were required to "examine the
[meretricious] relationship and the property accumulations and make a
just and equitable disposition of the property., 57 The court gave few
guidelines for determining the existence of a meretricious relationship,
stating that courts should examine each relationship on a case-by-case
basis.5 8
The Washington Supreme Court refined the meretricious relationship
59 by further defining a meretricious
doctrine in Connell v. Francisco
relationship and explaining how courts must distribute the property
acquired in such a relationship.6 The court in Connell defined a
meretricious relationship as having three elements: the relationship must
be stable, marital-like, and both parties must cohabit with knowledge
that a lawful marriage between them does not exist." Connell also listed
five relevant factors for determining if a relationship is sufficiently
stable and marital-like: continuous cohabitation, the duration of the
relationship, the purpose of the relationship, any pooling of resources,
and the intent of the parties.62
Connell then explained how a court must distribute the property
acquired during a meretricious relationship. A court first finds whether a
meretricious relationship existed; then, if it did, a court determines the
interest each party has in the property acquired in the relationship and,
55. Id. at 113. Marvin further held that in the absence of an express contract, a court should
determine if the conduct of the parties created an implied contract, implied partnership, or joint
venture or warranted the application of equitable remedies such as constructive trusts. Id. at 110.
56. 101 Wash. 2d 299, 678 P.2d 328 (1984).
57.
1057,
58.
59.

Id. at 304, 678 P.2d at 331 (citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d
1059 (1976)).
Id. at 305, 678 P.2d at 331.
127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995).

60. Id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 835-36.
61. Id. at 356, 898 P.2d at 834.
62. Id. See infra Part II for further detail.
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finally, justly and equitably divides it.6" Courts should only consider
property for distribution that would have been community property had
the parties been married. ' Community property legislation, however, is
the only marriage legislation that may apply to meretricious
relationships." The Connell court warned that courts may not equate
meretricious relationships with marriage in other ways, thereby creating
a type of common law marriage.66
With the meretricious relationship doctrine, Washington courts have
developed an equitable-property doctrine from which any unmarried
couple who has cohabited in a stable, marital-like relationship may
benefit.67 The parties to a meretricious relationship do not have to prove
the existence of a business partnership or establish any wrongdoing for a
constructive trust. Instead, the party suing for equitable division of the
property must show that the relationship was stable and marital-like, and
that the couple cohabited knowing they were not in a lawful
relationship." If these factors are met, the relationship is labeled
"meretricious," and the property is characterized as if it were community
property and divided on a just and equitable basis.69
C.

Same-Sex Couples' PropertyRights in Washington

Same-sex couples may only benefit from those property rights
available to unmarried couples. Same-sex couples may not legally marry
in Washington, as a result of Singer v. Hara7 and a 1998 amendment to
the marriage statute defining prohibited marriages. 7' Accordingly, samesex couples must seek property remedies under the meretricious
relationship doctrine or under contract and restitution remedies. If samesex relationships cannot qualify as meretricious relationships, same-sex
couples have more limited remedies than unmarried heterosexual

63. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 349, 898 P.2d at 835.

64. Id. at 352, 898 P.2d at 837.
65. See id at 348-50, 898 P.2d at 835-36.
66. Id. at 349-50, 898 P.2d at 836.

67. See id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 835-36.
68. Id. at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.

69. Id.at 349, 898 P.2d at 835.
70. 11 Wash. App. 247,522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
71. Act of Feb. 6, 1998, ch. 1, 1998 Wash. Laws I (codified at WASH. REv. CODE
§ 26.04.020(1)(c) (2000)).
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couples when seeking equitable
distribution of property at the termi2
nation of their relationships.1
Same-sex couples may not legally marry in Washington, according to
Singer, which upheld the denial of a marriage license to two men in
1974.7 The court held that a plain reading of the marriage statute did not
authorize same-sex marriages.74 The court further denied the appellants'
claims under the newly enacted state Equal Rights Amendment75 and a
federal equal protection claim,76 finding that the fundamental nature of
marriage requires a union between a man and a woman.77
The Washington Legislature amended the marriage statute on
prohibited marriages in 1998 explicitly to ban same-sex marriages.7 8 In
the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 79 Congress provided that a state
shall not be required to recognize marriages between persons of the
same-sex where such a relationship is treated as a marriage in another
state.8° Subsequently, the Washington Legislature passed the amendment
to the marriage statute to ensure that Washington would not recognize
same-sex marriages in the event they were legalized in other states.8 '
The marriage statute explicitly states that "[i]t is a compelling interest of
the state of Washington to reaffirm its historical commitment to the
institution of marriage as a union between a 82man and a woman as
husband and wife and to protect that institution.,

72. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
73. 11Wash. App. at 264, 522 P.2d at 1197.
74. Id. at 249, 522 P.2d at 1189 (noting that although marriage statute at time had gender neutral
language, 1970 amendment merely eliminated different marrying age requirements for men and
women).
75. Id. at 258-59, 522 P.2d at 1194; Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1.
76. Singer, II Wash. App. at 261, 522 P.2d at 1196.
77. Id. at 253,522 P.2d at 1191.
78. Act of Feb. 6, 1998, ch. 1, 1998 Wash. Laws 1, codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.020(l)(c) (2000).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998).
80. Id.
81. Act of Feb. 6, 1998, ch. 1, 1998 Wash. Laws 1, codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.020(1)(c)); E.S.H.B. 1130, 55th Leg., IstReg. Sess. (Wash.); see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (holding that state had burden of proving that prohibiting same-sex marriages
furthered compelling state interests and did not abridge constitutional rights).
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.0 10.

Vasquez v. Hawthorne
Without legal marriage, same-sex couples are denied numerous
benefits available to heterosexual couples upon marriage." Some of
these benefits can be provided for by contract, such as creating decisionmaking powers by enacting durable powers of attorney, or distributing
property by testamentary intent. However, without an express contract,
same-sex couples will have to rely on equitable doctrines, such as
constructive trust, resulting trust, or implied partnership, to determine
property rights at the end of a relationship. 84 Moreover, same-sex
couples might seek to have their property equitably divided under the
meretricious relationship doctrine.8 5
Washington's property-distribution scheme clearly differs for married
and unmarried couples. Marriage offers the most equitable protection for
the distribution of property because Washington adheres to the
community property regime. Courts allow unmarried couples to take
advantage of community property principles through the meretricious
relationship doctrine. Before Vasquez, no court had distinguished
Washington's property scheme on the basis of sexual orientation and no
rule barred same-sex couples from seeking the same remedies as
unmarried heterosexual couples. Instead, courts evaluated unmarried
couples' property rights under the conduct-based meretricious
relationship test.
II.

WASHINGTON COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE
MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIP TEST

Washington courts determine if an unmarried couple's relationship
qualifies as a meretricious relationship by analyzing the couple's
conduct. Lindsey and Connell defined a meretricious relationship as
having three elements: stability, marital-like behavior, and cohabitation
with the knowledge that a lawful marriage does not exist. 86 Courts
analyze the couple's conduct in five areas to decide if a relationship is

83. See Jamie D. Pederson, The RCW Project: An Analysis of the Benefits and Burdens of
Marriage Contained in the Revised Code of Washington, at http://www.buddybuddy.commarwa2.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2000); see also Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 883-84 (Vt. 1999)

(noting number of benefits marriage bestows).
84. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 99 Wash. App. 363, 365, 994 P.2d 240, 241, review
granted,141 Wash. 2d 1025, 11 P.3d 825 (2000).

85. See, e.g., id
86. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995); see also In re
Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299,304,678 P.2d 328,331 (1984).
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"stable" or "marital-like": continuous cohabitation, the duration of the
relationship, the purpose of the relationship, the intent of the parties, and
any pooling of resources. 8 In practice, courts tend to analyze the
continuity and duration of the relationship to determine stability and
evaluate purpose, intent, and pooling of resources to determine maritallike behavior.88 These factors are not mutually exclusive; rather, courts
view them as a whole to determine if a meretricious relationship exists.89
A.

A MeretriciousRelationshipIs a Stable Relationship

Courts examine the "stability" of a relationship to determine whether
or not a relationship qualifies as meretricious.9" The continuity and
duration of cohabitation indicate stability.9" Washington courts have
refused to develop a bright-line rule regarding the continuity or duration
of cohabitation to determine if a meretricious relationship is sufficiently
stable.92
Washington courts have alternatively affirmed and denied the
existence of a meretricious relationship where the cohabitation was not
continuous. For example, the Washington Court of Appeals has found a
meretricious relationship despite the couple experiencing periods of
separation where the couple had children and acquired a home
together. 93 Conversely, the Washington Supreme Court found that no
meretricious relationship existed where in addition to the woman
moving out twice and once living with another man, the parties did not
share expenses for periods of time, did not mutually invest in a
significant asset, and one refused to marry while the other wanted to.94
Similarly, Washington courts have established no minimum time
limit during which a couple must cohabit for the relationship to be
87. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834; Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 304, 678 P.2d at
331.
88. See, e.g., In re Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d 592, 603-05, 14 P.3d 764, 771-72 (2000); see
also Gavin M. Parr, Note, What is a "Meretricious Relationship"?: An Analysis of Cohabitant
PropertyRights Under Connell v. Francisco, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1243, 1255-62 (1999).
89. Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d at 601-02, 14 P.3d at 770.
90. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834; Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 304, 678 P.2d at
331.
91. See Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d at 603-04, 14 P.3d at 771.
92. Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 305, 678 P.2d at 331.
93. Warden v. Warden, 36 Wash. App. 693, 698, 676 P.2d 1037, 1039-40 (1984).
94. Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d at 603-08, 14 P.3d at 771-73.
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sufficiently stable. The Washington Court of Appeals held that a fourmonth relationship was sufficient to establish a meretricious
relationship." Longer relationships may be helpful to prove the
relationship was "meretricious," 96 but a lengthy relationship is not
required.97
B.

A MeretriciousRelationshipIs a Marital-LikeRelationship

A relationship must be marital-like in order for the courts to
recognize it as a meretricious relationship. 98 "Marital" is defined as "[o]f
or relating to the marriage relationship," 9 while the marriage
relationship can be defined by legal status or by the conduct of the
parties.0 0 Therefore, when determining if a relationship is marital-like,
courts can either evaluate the legal status or the conduct of the parties.
Until Vasquez, Washington courts had used conduct to make this
determination.
1.

MaritalIs Defined by Legal Status or the Conduct of the Parties

The word "marriage" can refer to a legal construct or to a social
construct. As a legal construct, marriage refers to entrance into the
marriage contract and to the assumption of legal benefits and
obligations. As a social construct, marriage is defined by conduct
befitting a marriage.
Legally, marriage is defined by its statutory requirements and a host
of legal benefits and obligations.'0 ' The essential requirements of a valid
95. In re DeHollander, 53 Wash. App. 695, 696-99, 770 P.2d 638, 639-41 (1989).
96. See, e.g., Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App. 880, 885, 812 P.2d 523, 526 (1991) (finding
meretricious relationship where couple cohabited for ten continuous years, acted like married
couple, and pooled their resources for joint projects).
97. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995) (stating relationship
need not be "long term"); see also In re Marriage of Kinzer, No. 16035-1-Ili, 1998 WL 151795, at
*2-3 (Wash. App. Apr. 2, 1998) (finding cohabitation for twenty-three months before marriage
sufficient to establish meretricious relationship); Anderson v. Anders, No. 14572-7-111, 1997 WL
6984, at *2 (Wash. App. Jan. 9, 1997) (finding cohabitation for thirty-seven months sufficient to
establish meretricious relationship).
98. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834; In re Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 304, 678
P.2d 328,331 (1984).
99. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (7th ed. 1999).
100. See infra notes 101-04.
101. See supra note 15.
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marriage are parties being legally able to contract, having mutual
consent, and actually contracting as prescribed by law.10 2 Once two
people are married, hundreds of Washington statutes"03 and even more
federal statutes"e confer various benefits and obligations upon the
married couple as a result of the couple's legal status.
Socially, marriage is manifested by the conduct between two people.
For example, the act of marrying is often accompanied by a symbolic
religious ceremony. In the marriage, the conduct typically includes
living together and supporting each other physically, financially, and
emotionally. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this conduct
aspect of marriage by stating that marriage is "an association that
promotes a way of life."'0 5
2.

Washington CourtsHave Defined "Marital-Like" by Conduct

Washington courts have defined "marital-like" by examining the way
the parties conduct themselves.0 6 Courts determine if a relationship is
marital-like by examining the purpose of the relationship, the intent of
the relationship, and the pooling of resources.'0 7 Therefore, "maritallike" in the meretricious relationship context refers to "promot[ing] a
way of life."10 8
Courts evaluate the purpose of a relationship to determine if a
meretricious relationship is sufficiently marital-like. °9 The Washington
Court of Appeals has described the "purpose of the relationship" as the
intent to "create a 'long-term, stable, nonmarital family relationship.'"' 0
Evidence that the couple planned to spend the rest of their lives together
is sufficient to establish this purpose."' Other courts have found a
102. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §26.04.160 (2000) (indicating application for license,
contents, and oath).
103. See Pederson, supranote 83.
104. Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, What Rights Come With Legal Marriage,
at http://www.buddybuddy.com/mar-wa.html (last visited Nov. 9,2000).
105. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
106. See In re Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d 592,601-02, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (2000).
107. See id.; Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995).
108. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
109. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.
110. Anderson v. Anders, No. 14572-7-111, 1997 WL 6984, at *2 (Wash. App. Jan. 9, 1997)
(citing Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1976)).
111. Id.
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relationship to have a marital-like purpose if the relationship included

elements like companionship, friendship, love, and mutual support. "2
Courts have also found a meretricious relationship where the parties

mutually support each other in work and leisure activities." 3

Courts also examine the intent to function as a family to determine if
a meretricious relationship is sufficiently marital-like." 4 Courts look for
evidence that the couple intended to form a long-term, familial

relationship such as intending to remain together as a couple.." For
example, the Washington Court of Appeals found that a meretricious
relationship did not exist where the couple waited years to divorce their
spouses and haphazardly shared a living space." 6 The court could not

determine from the evidence what the intent of the parties was regarding
the relationship." 7
A party" ' may evidence intent to remain together by showing that the
couple modeled themselves after married couples. Courts, however, are
inconsistent regarding whether or not the couple must have publicly
acted as if they were married. Older, pre-Lindsey and Connell cases

examined whether or not the couple "held themselves out as husband
and wife."'' More recently, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected
the proposition that the parties must have publicly appeared as a maritallike couple. 2
112. Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d at 605, 14 P.3d. at 772.
113. See, e.g., In re Sutton, 85 Wash. App. 487,491,933 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1997).
114. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.
115. See, e.g., Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d at 603-05, 14 P.3d at 771-72 (finding one party's
refusal to marry and other party's absences and relationship with third party negated intent; also
finding that one party's marriage to another negated intent); Zion Constr., Inc. v. Gilmore, 78
Wash. App. 87, 90, 895 P.2d 864, 866 (1995) (finding meretricious relationship where couple
cohabited, pooled resources, and intended to marry).
116. Henry v. Henry, No. 18128-6-111, 2000 WL 155093, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000)
(denying meretricious relationship where one party brought old couch and some clothes to other
party's apartment).
117. Id.
118. The meretricious relationship cases involve one member of the relationship seeking a
community property-like distribution of assets.
119. See In re Thomton, 14 Wash. App. 397, 403, 541 P.2d 1243, 1247 (1975) (holding facts
did not support that couple ever held themselves out as husband and wife); Lalley v. Lalley, 43
Wash. 2d 192, 194-96, 260 P.2d 905, 906-7 (1953) (denying claim to title of car where parties did
not live together, have marital relations, or hold themselves out as married couple).
120. Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App. 880, 884-85, 812 P.2d 523, 525 (1991) ("[lIt is not
necessary for a couple to represent themselves as husband and wife to establish a pseudomarital
relationship.").
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Finally, a party did not have to be free to marry in order for a court to
find that he or she was part of a meretricious relationship. In fact,
marriage to a third person is not a per se rule against finding a
meretricious relationship. 121 Courts have found that marriage to another
person is a significant factor that a meretricious relationship may not
exist because it is evidence that at least one party lacked the intent to
form a long-term, familial relationship. 12 Courts, however, recognize
that certain circumstances may support a finding of a meretricious
relationship when one of the parties is married.' 23 Courts in at least three
cases 124 have found meretricious relationships despite one party's
marriage to a third party during a period of the meretricious relationship.
Courts also evaluate a couple's pooling of resources to determine if a
meretricious relationship is sufficiently marital-like.1 5 The pooling of
resources may be tangible evidence that the couple existed in a mutually
supportive, familial relationship.'26 Courts generally find a meretricious
relationship existed where couples pooled their resources for household
and personal expenses, worked to improve their home together, and
worked for each other without salary.2 7 The courts may look favorably
upon couples having
joint bank accounts,' 28 but sharing a bank account
129
is not necessary.
121. In re Kinzer, No. 16035-1-1Il, 1998 WL 151795, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1998).
122. In re Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d 592, 603-05, 14 P.3d 764, 771-72 (2000).
123. In re Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913, 919, 971 P.2d 98, 101-02 (1998), a/i'd, 142 Wash.
2d 592, 14 P.3d 764 (2000) (distinguishing and not disapproving of Foster, where Washington
Court of Appeals found meretricious relationship existed when one party was married to third
party). The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Pennington and did not disapprove of Foster nor
the court of appeals's reading of Foster.Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d at 595-99, 14 P.3d at 767-69.
124. Foster, 61 Wash. App. at 884-85, 812 P.2d at 525-26 (finding meretricious relationship
despite man being married to another woman in beginning of relationship); Kinzer, 1998 WL
15179, at *2 (same); Warden v. Warden, 36 Wash. App. 693,694-98, 698, 676 P.2d 1037, 103740 (1984) (finding meretricious relationship despite man's marriage to another woman during last
five years of relationship).
125. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d, 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995).
126. See id.
127. See, e.g., In re Sutton, 85 Wash. App. 487, 491, 933 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1997); In re DamonRau, No. 19860-6-Il, 1997 WL 671997, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 1997); Anderson v. Anders,
No. 14572-7-111, 1997 WL 6984, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1997); Zion Constr., Inc. v.
Gilmore, 78 Wash. App. 87, 90, 895 P.2d 864, 866 (1995).
128. See Fletcher v. Olmstead, No. 19319-1-11, 1996 WL 734263, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec.
20, 1996) (denying meretricious relationship in part because parties maintained separate finances
even though they pooled money for rent, utilities, and groceries).
129. See Anderson, 1997 WL 6984, at *3 (finding meretricious relationship despite fact couple
did not have joint bank account).
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The Washington Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in In re
Pennington3 ' that a meretricious relationship is defined by conduct. The
court stated that "the term 'marital-like' is a mere analogy because
defining meretricious relationships as related to marriage would create a
de facto common-law marriage, which this court has refused to do."''
Rather, courts evaluate factors such as the continuity of cohabitation and
duration of the relationship, the purpose and intent of the parties, and the
pooling of resources and services.' One factor is not weighted more
heavily than another. 3 3 Instead, the factors are looked at as a whole to
determine if a relationship is meretricious.
III. VASQUEZ v. HAWTHORNE: THE WASHINGTON COURT OF
APPEALS HELD THAT SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS
CANNOT BE MERETRICIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW
In Vasquez v. Hawthorne,34 the Washington Court of Appeals held
that one fact, the parties' inability to marry, precluded the possibility of
the couple existing in a meretricious relationship.'35 Accordingly, unlike
the trial court, the court of appeals found that same-sex relationships
cannot be meretricious as a matter of law and refused to analyze the
facts of the case.' 36 The decision is currently under review by the
Washington Supreme Court.'37
FactualBackground

A.

The case stems from the long term relationship of Frank Vasquez and
Robert Schwerzler; 38 however, the trial court and the court of appeals
provided limited information about Vasquez and Schwerzler's
relationship. The trial court simply found that Vasquez and Schwerzler

142 Wash. 2d 592, 14 P.3d 764 (2000).
Id. at 602, 14 P.3dat 770.
Id.
See id.
134. 99 Wash. App. 363, 994 P.2d 240, review granted, 141 Wash. 2d 1025, 11 P.3d 825
130.
131.
132.
133.

(2000).
135. Id. at 364, 994 P.2d at 241.
136. Id.
137. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, review granted,141 Wash. 2d 1025, 11 P.3d 825 (2000).
138. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 364, 994 P.2d at 241.
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existed in a meretricious relationship.'3 9 The court of appeals found that
same-sex relationships cannot be meretricious as a matter of law. 4 ° The
court of appeals only noted the fact that Vasquez and Schwerzler
cohabited for twenty-eight years, living together from 1967 until
Schwerzler died in 1995.141
Vasquez's briefs, affidavits, and the affidavits of acquaintances and
friends of Vasquez and Schwerzler support the view that Vasquez and
Schwerzler existed in a marital-like relationship.' 42 These materials
show that Vasquez and Schwerzler supported each other personally'43
and professionally.'" Vasquez and Schwerzler also held themselves out
in public as an intimate couple in certain circumstances.' 45
Vasquez and Schwerzler extensively supported each other in their
personal lives. Vasquez performed many household chores, such as
cooking and cleaning, 46 and cared directly for Schwerzler by cutting
Schwerzler's hair and nails. 147 He referred to Schwerzler as "my
husband."' 48 Vasquez did not have a bank account of his own 1 49 and
relied on Schwerzler to take care of the finances. 5 Schwerzler was
seventeen years older than Vasquez and frequently assured Vasquez that
139. See Vasquez, No. 96-2-07794-7, at 3-5 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1997) (order
granting plaintiff partial summary judgment) [hereinafter Order].
140. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 364; 994 P.2d at 241.
141. Id.
142. Because the trial court denied defendant Hawthorne's motion to strike the affidavits
supporting plaintiff Vasquez's motion for summary judgment and therefore presumably relied upon
this material in deciding that Vasquez and Schwerzler had a meretricious relationship, plaintiff's
briefs and affidavits are relied upon here. Order, supra note 139, at 3.
143. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2-3,
Vasquez, No. 96-2-07794-7 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Plaintiffs
Memorandum].
144. Id. at 3; Declaration of Brian Sword in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
4, Vasquez, No. 96-2-07794-7 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Sword
Declaration]; Affidavit of Frank Vasquez in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 4,
Vasquez, No. 96-2-07794-7 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Vasquez
Affidavit].
145. Declaration of Richard Kinzner in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 1-2, Vasquez, No. 96-2-07794-7 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 1996) [hereinafter
Kinzner Declaration].
146. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supranote 143, at 2-3.
147. Id.
148. Kinzner Declaration, supra note 145, at 1.
149. Vasquez Affidavit, supra note 144, at 2.
150. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 143, at 2-3. Vasquez suffered a childhood head injury
that has rendered him barely literate. Vasquez Affidavit, supra note 144, at 4.
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he would be taken care of if he died first,' even offering to sell their
home and give Vasquez half of the money.2
Vasquez and Schwerzler also shared responsibilities in the bagrecycling business they managed from their home. Schwerzler bought
and sold bags and managed the finances.' Vasquez performed the
physical labor required for this business and took phone calls from
clients.' 54 Schwerzler never paid Vasquez for his work.'55
Schwerzler and Vasquez circulated as a couple among some
friends,' 56 but among Schwerzler's heterosexual friends and family,
Schwerzler was apparently ambiguous or secretive about his relationship
with Vasquez. For example, one of his friends assumed Vasquez and
Schwerzler were a couple because of Schwerzler's conduct, such as
always letting Vasquez know when he expected to be home and bringing
Vasquez lunch during the working day.'57 Two of Schwerzler's siblings
believe he was not gay,'58 perhaps because Schwerzler had been married
and divorced three times. 5 9
Upon his death, Schwerzler left no will that was located. 60 The home,
the checking account, and other assets including a life-insurance policy,
an automobile, and proceeds from the sale of a second automobile were
in Schwerzler's name.' 6' Schwerzler's life-insurance proceeds were paid
to the personal representative of his estate. 62

151. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 143, at 4; Vasquez Affidavit, supra note 144, at 6;
Sword Declaration, supra note 144, at 3.
152. Vasquez Affidavit, supranote 144, at 6.
153. Id. at4.
154. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 143, at 3; Sword Declaration, supra note 144, at 4;
Vasquez Affidavit, supra note 144, at 4.
155. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 143, at 4; Vasquez Affidavit, supra note 144, at 5.
156. Kinzner Declaration, supra note 145, at 1-2.
157. Declaration of Robert Whitworth in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2,
Vasquez v. Hawthorne, No. 96-2-07794-7 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 1997).
158. Brief of Appellant Joseph Hawthorne at 29, Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. 363, 994 P.2d 240
(No. 96-2-07794-7).
159. Id. at 12.
160. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App at 364,994 P.2d at 241.
161. Id. at 364,994 P.2d at 241; Order, supra note 139, at 4.
162. Plaintiff's Memorandum, supranote 143, at 19.
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ProceduralBackground and Status

B.

Because Schwerzler died intestate, his estate passed to his siblings
under Washington's intestacy statute. 63 Vasquez sued for his share of
Schwerzler's estate under the theories of meretricious relationship,
implied partnership, and constructive trust."64 The trial court awarded the
entire estate to Vasquez under the meretricious relationship theory on
Vasquez's motion for partial summary judgment.165 Joseph Hawthorne,
the estate's personal representative, appealed, and a unanimous court of
appeals reversed, holding that a same-sex 1 66
relationship could not be a
meretricious relationship as a matter of law.
The Washington Supreme Court granted review of Vasquez. 67 The
issue of whether or not same-sex couples can sue for property division
under the meretricious relationship theory has never before been decided
in Washington.16 Vasquez's theories of implied partnership and
constructive trust have not yet been tried. 169
C.

The Court ofAppeals Opinion

The Washington Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the trial
court judgment, holding that same-sex relationships cannot qualify as
meretricious relationships in Washington. 7 ° The court's brief opinion,
after summarizing the development of the meretricious relationship
doctrine, focused solely on the "marital-like" element of the
meretricious relationship test. 7' The court stated that "because persons
of the same sex may not be legally married, a meretricious relationship
cannot exist between members of the same sex."' 72 Thus, Vasquez
received none of the property he acquired with Schwerzler during their
twenty-eight year intimate relationship.

163. WASH. REV. CODE § I 1.04.015(2)(c) (2000).
164. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App at 364-65, 994 P.2d at 241.
165. Id. at 364, 994 P.2d at 241.
166. Id. at 364-65,994 P.2d at 241.
167. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 141 Wash. 2d 1025, I1P.3d 825 (2000).
168. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 365, 994 P.2d at 241.
169. Id. at 365, 994 P.2d at 241.
170. Id. at 364, 994 P.2d at 241.
171. Id. at 367-68, 994 P.2d at 242-43.
172. Id. at 365, 994 P.2d at 241.
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The court first reviewed the history of the meretricious relationship
doctrine. The court noted its creation in Lindsey, its further development
in Connell, and that the doctrine overturned the Creasman
presumption. 73 The court restated Connell's holding that the only
property that can be distributed upon a finding of a meretricious
relationship is that property which would have been community property
had the parties been married. 74
The Vasquez court then reasoned that if the only property available
for distribution at the end of a meretricious relationship is property that
would have been community property ifthe parties had been married,
then a meretricious relationship must be one in which the parties may
legally marry.'75 To the Vasquez court, only potentially marital
relationships can benefit from quasi-marital protection.' 76 Thus, the
parties' legal status is a conclusive factor in determining whether or not
the couple can exist in a meretricious relationship.
The Vasquez court then noted that Washington's marriage statute
prohibits legal marriage between same-sex partners. The court
concluded that this statutory definition of legal marriage prohibits the
equitable doctrine of meretricious relationships from ever including
same-sex relationships. 77 As support for this conclusion, the Vasquez
court held that Connell and its progeny must have "implicitly assumed
that a meretricious relationship can exist only between a man and a
woman."'7 8 This implicit assumption led the Vasquez court to conclude
that only the legislature could apply the judicial doctrine of meretricious
relationship to same-sex couples. 179 As a matter of law, the court held
that same-sex relationships could not be marital-like.8

173. Id. at 366, 994 P.2d at 242.

174. Id. at 367.
175. Id. at 367, 994 P.2d at 242.
176. Id. at 369, 994 P.2d at 243. The Vasquez court used "quasi-marital" synonymously with
"marital-like," calling a meretricious relationship a quasi-marital relationship. See id. at 368, 994
P.2d at 243.
177. Id. at 367-68, 994 P.2d at 242-43.
178. Id. at 367, 994 P.2d at 242.
179. Id. at 369, 994 P.2d at 243. The court noted that Vasquez had the recourses of constructive
trust and implied partnership. Id.
180. Id. at 364, 994 P.2d at 241.
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IV. THE VASQUEZ COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE DOES
NOT APPLY TO SAME-SEX COUPLES
The Vasquez court should have defined "marital-like" according to
the conduct of the parties and not according to their legal status. In
determining that, as a matter of law, same-sex relationships cannot
qualify as meretricious relationships, the Vasquez court erred in three
ways. First, the court strayed from precedent by crafting a bright-line
rule that status determines who may benefit from the meretricious
relationship doctrine. Second, the court erred in using the Washington
marriage statute regarding prohibited marriages to modify the judicial
doctrine of meretricious relationships. Third, in applying the statute, the
court wrongly interpreted the intent and purpose of the meretricious
relationship doctrine.
A.

The Vasquez CourtDeviatedfrom Precedent by Crafting a BrightLine Rule

The bright-line rule established in Vasquez deviates from all previous
application of the meretricious relationship doctrine. In determining
whether a meretricious relationship exists, courts must analyze all the
relevant evidence of the parties' conduct on a case-by-case basis.' 8 ' No
one factor weighs more than another in importance.' The Vasquez court
strayed from precedent by deciding that the parties' legal ability to
marry outweighed the totality of the parties' conduct.' 83 The court
further wrongly crafted a bright-line rule when deciding the parties must
be male and female. Moreover, the Vasquez court misinterpreted
precedent when it used marriage legislation to draw this bright-line rule.
Precedent does not support the Vasquez court's conclusion that the
marriage statute' 84 determines who may enter into meretricious
relationships. Courts have found meretricious relationships when one of

181. In re Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d 592, 601-02, 14 P.3d 764, 770 (2000); In re Lindsey, 101
Wash. 2d 299, 305, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (1984).
182. Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d at 602, 14 P.3d at 770.
183. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 369, 994 P.2d at 243.
184. WASH. REV CODE § 26.04.020 (2000).
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the parties has been married to a third party;' 85 yet, the marriage statute
does not allow marriage when one or both parties are married to another
person.' 86 In Warden,'87 Kinzer,'88 and Foster'89 the Washington Court of

Appeals found meretricious relationships existed even when one party
was married to another for a portion of the meretricious relationship.
The Washington Court of Appeals has indicated that one party's
marriage to a third party was not a dispositive factor where a
relationship was long-term and the parties pooled their resources for
many purposes 90 The Washington Supreme Court recently noted that
marriage to a third party may be evidence of one party's lack of intent
regarding the relationship, but reaffirmed its commitment to determining
the existence of meretricious relationship on a case-by-case basis and
did not craft a bright-line rule regarding the parties' legal status. 9 '
Before Vasquez, Washington courts did not look to the legal status of the
couple to determine if the conduct was marriage-like.
Furthermore, no court before Vasquez had held that one of the
requirements for a meretricious relationship is that the parties be one
man and one woman. The Vasquez court was unable to point to any
specific language in previous cases and could only find "that these
courts implicitly assumed that a meretricious relationship can exist only
between a man and a woman."' 92 Yet, because no fact scenarios had

been presented other than those that dealt with opposite-sex couples, no
cases had considered whether a meretricious relationship hinged on the
gender of the parties. By giving legal significance to assumptions, the
Vasquez court equated mind reading with the interpretation of precedent.
Finally, Vasquez misinterpreted Connell when it used marriage
legislation to craft its bright-line rule that same-sex relationships could
not be meretricious relationships. The Vasquez court reasoned that if
185. In re Kinzer, No. 16035-14I, 1998 WL 151795, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 1998);
Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash. App. 880, 884-85, 812 P.2d 523, 525-26 (1991); Warden v. Warden,
36 Wash. App. 693, 694, 698, 676 P.2d 1037, 1037-38, 1039-40 (1984).
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(a).
187. Warden, 36 Wash. App. at 694,698,676 P.2d at 1037-38, 1040.
188. Kinzer, 1998 WL 151795, at *3.
189. Foster,61 Wash. App. at 884-85, 812 P.2d at 525-26.
190. In re Pennington, 93 Wash. App. 913, 919-20, 971 P.2d 98, 101-02 (1998), afl'd, 142
Wash. 2d 592, 14 P.3d 764 (2000) (distinguishing Foster as appropriate finding of meretricious

relationship where one party was married to third party).
191. Pennington,142 Wash. 2d at 601-05, 14 P.3d at 770-72.
192. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 99 Wash. App. 363, 367, 994 P.2d 240, 242, review granted, 141
Wash. 2d 1025, 11 P.3d 825 (2000).
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courts distribute property at the termination of a meretricious
relationship based on what would have been community property if the
parties had been married, then the parties must be legally able to marry
in order to exist in a meretricious relationship.' 93 Yet this reasoning
inverts the logic of Connell. Connell requires that courts first find that a
meretricious relationship existed; second, determine the interest each
party has in the property; and third, distribute the property according to
principles of community property.'94 Thus Connell called for the use of
marriage legislation as a guide for the third prong. Vasquez found the
marriage statutes not only determinative of how to distribute property,
but determinative of whether to distribute the property at all, thus
applying marriage legislation to the first prong.'95 The court in Connell,
however, explicitly stated that "a meretricious relationship is not the
same as marriage."' 96 Using marriage legislation to craft a bright-line
rule for what constitutes a meretricious relationship finds no support in
the Connell court's recourse to community property statutes to make a
just and equitable distribution of property.
The Vasquez decision is an anomaly among meretricious relationship
cases that have used a case-by-case, factor-based approach and that have
only used marriage legislation in determining how, not whether, to
distribute the property. Courts have not established any bright-line rules
when deciding if a relationship qualifies as meretricious. Vasquez is the
first case to draw a bright-line rule, and it hides behind an irrelevant
statute to do so.
B.

The Vasquez CourtDeviatedfrom StatutoryInterpretationby
Applying a Washington MarriageStatute to the Common Law
Doctrine ofMeretriciousRelationships

The Vasquez court, in holding that the statutory limitations on who
may marry in Washington are determinative of who can engage in a

193. Id. at 367-68, 994 P.2d at 242-243.
194. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 349, 898 P.2d 831, 835 (1995).
195. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 369, 994 P.2d at 243. Although the court claims that the
"statutory limitations on who may marry ... are relevant in determining whether a relationship is
sufficiently 'marital-like,"' the use of the word "relevant" is misleading. The court's holding, that
same-sex relationships cannot be marital-like because same-sex couples may not marry, renders the
statutory limitations determinative. Id. at 367-68, 994 P.2d at 242-43.
196. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 349-50, 898 P.2d at 836.
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meretricious relationship,

97

deviated from traditional statutory interpre-

tation. Neither a plain reading of the marriage statute prohibiting certain
marriages' nor the legislative history of the amendment prohibiting
same-sex marriages suggests that the marriage statute modifies the
judicially created doctrine of meretricious relationships. The Vasquez
court's reliance on the Washington marriage statute was misplaced.
A plain reading of the marriage statute prohibiting certain
marriages'9 9 does not support the Vasquez court's conclusion that the
marriage statute determines who may enter into meretricious
relationships. The statute is titled "Prohibited Marriages" and contains a
list of who may not marry in Washington.0 0 The statute does not address
any other legal rights or remedies, define who may cohabit together or
form intimate relation-ships, or criminalize certain sexual relationships.
The statute nowhere defines property rights. Rather, the plain language
of the statute defines only who may undertake the legal rights and
obligations of marriage.20 ' The Vasquez court, however, applied the
statute in deciding who may benefit from the meretricious relationship
doctrine,20 2 despite the Washington Supreme Court's statements that
meretricious relationships are "wholly unrelated"20 3 to and "not the same
as'' 204 marriage.
The legislative history of the subsection of the marriage statute that
specifically prohibits same-sex marriages also does not support the
Vasquez court's conclusion that the statute determines who may enter
meretricious relationships. The Legislature adopted the amendment
specifically prohibiting same-sex marriage in response to Congress's
Defense of Marriage Act, which authorized states not to recognize samesex marriages in other states. 205 The Defense of Marriage Act affected
marriage and not any common law doctrines. 2 6 The legislative history of
the Washington amendment shows no indication the Legislature
197. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 369, 994 P.2d at 243.
198. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020 (2000).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 367-68, 994 P.2d at 242-43.
203. In re Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d 592, 600, 14 P.3d 764, 769 (2000).
204. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 349-50, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (1995).
205. Act of Feb. 6, 1998, ch. 1, 1998 Wash. Laws 1 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.020(1)(c)); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV. 1998).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
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intended to restrict other types of rights and remedies applicable to
same-sex couples." 7 The amendment created a single legal disability: a
limit on the right to marry. Neither a plain reading of the statute nor the
legislative history supports the Vasquez court's conclusion that the
marriage statute prohibiting certain marriages should determine that
same-sex relationships cannot be marital-like.
C.

The Vasquez Court Deviatedfrom the Intent and Purpose of the
MeretriciousRelationshipDoctrine

The Vasquez court deviated from the intent and purpose of the
meretricious relationship doctrine when it held that in order to be
marital-like parties must have the legal ability to marry.2" 8 The
meretricious relationship doctrine is a judicial remedy, created with the
intent to protect the property rights of unmarried couples. The
meretricious relationship doctrine's sole purpose, however, is to address
property rights. This limitation explicitly prevents meretricious
relationships from being common law marriages. 20 9 Implicitly, it

preserves the incentives for couples to marry.
Washington courts created the meretricious relationship doctrine to
protect the property rights of people who are not legally married. When
creating the meretricious relationship doctrine and overruling the
Creasman presumption, the Washington Supreme Court recognized that
the Creasman presumption unjustly rewarded the "cunning and the
shrewd" who could deliberately hold title to all property at the end of a
meretricious relationship despite the fact that the property may have
been acquired through joint efforts. 210 The meretricious relationship
doctrine balances the scales between the shrewd party and the party
without title by dividing property justly and equitably without regard to
who holds title. 21 By excluding same-sex couples from the meretricious

207. Act of Feb. 6, 1998, ch. 1, 1998 Wash. Laws 1, codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.020(1)(c); E.S.H.B. 1130, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash.).
208. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 99 Wash. App. 363, 364, 994 P.2d 240, 241, review granted, 141
Wash. 2d 1025, 11 P.3d 825 (2000).
209. In re Pennington, 142 Wash. 2d 592, 600-01, 14 P.3d 764, 769-70 (2000); Connell v
Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 349-50, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (1995).
210. In re Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 303, 678 P.2d 328, 330 (1984) (citing West v. Knowles,
50 Wash. 2d 311, 316, 311 P.2d 689, 693 (1957) (Finley, J., concurring)).
211. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346-57, 898 P.2d 831, 834-35 (1995).
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relationship doctrine, Vasquez excludes those who the doctrine was
meant to protect.
While the meretricious relationship doctrine protects unmarried
couples, the doctrine addresses a much narrower spectrum of legal
obligations and benefits than marriage. The meretricious relationship
doctrine is solely an equitable property doctrine that distributes property
acquired during a stable, marital-like relationship at the termination of
that relationship.212 A meretricious relationship does not create a
common law marriage,2 13 as Washington does not allow common law
marriages"' and the court in Connell specifically held that couples in
meretricious relationships may not be treated as if they were married.215
The meretricious relationship does not establish rights of survivorship,
affect tax status, or grant any decision-making power if one party to the
relationship is debilitated. In contrast, legal marriage confers these
benefits and many others upon the involved parties.216
Because the intent and purpose of the meretricious relationship
doctrine is to provide only limited rights for unmarried couples, the
meretricious relationship doctrine does not detract from the state's role
in encouraging couples to marry legally. The state values marriage as a
"historical... institution."2 17 Any fear the Vasquez court had that
allowing same-sex couples to benefit from the meretricious relationship
doctrine threatens the institution of marriage is unfounded. Same-sex
marriage is already prohibited by statute;2" 8 it is only heterosexual
couples who may choose whether or not to legally marry, and courts
have not hesitated in applying the meretricious relationship doctrine to
heterosexual relationships. Moreover, because the meretricious relationship doctrine provides only limited rights for unmarried couples as
opposed to those conferred by marriage 1 9 and does not create a common
law marriage,' 0 couples have more of an incentive to marry than to
212.
213.
having
214.
215.
216.

Id.
A common law marriage is one where the couple is recognized as legally married after
cohabited for a certain period of time. Cross, supra note 17, at 20.
Id.
Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 350, 898 P.2d at 836.
Pederson, supra note 83; Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, supranote 104.
217. Act of Feb. 6, 1998, ch. 1, 1998 Wash. Laws I (codified at WASH. REv. CODE
26.04.020(1)(c) (2000)); E.S.H.B. 1130,55th Leg., IstReg. Sess. (Wash.).
218. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(c) (2000).
219. See Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 350, 898 P.2d at 836.
220. Id.
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cohabit without legal marriage. In fact, same-sex couples have
continually sought the legal right to marry and take on the many benefits
and burdens of legally sanctioned marriage.22
The Vasquez court ignored the intent and purpose of the meretricious
relationship doctrine when it held that to create a meretricious relationship, the parties must be free to marry under Washington statutory law.
The meretricious relationship doctrine is simply an equitable doctrine
providing limited protection in the area of property distribution for
unmarried couples. It is a judicially crafted doctrine that provides equity
precisely where statutory definitions do not apply. The doctrine's
purpose, statutory interpretation of the statute on prohibited marriages,
and precedent support applying the meretricious relationship doctrine to
same-sex couples. By looking solely to Frank Vasquez's statutory status,
the Vasquez court neglected its equitable duty to define meretricious
relationships on the basis of conduct.
V.

THE VASQUEZ DECISION VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY AND
IS HETEROSEXIST

Because same-sex couples engage in marital-like conduct, the court
should allow same-sex couples to benefit from the meretricious
relationship doctrine. The Vasquez court violated public policy by
denying the meretricious relationship doctrine to same-sex couples. The
court further demonstrated its own heterosexism by holding that samesex relationships cannot be marital-like.
A.

PublicPolicy Dictates that Same-Sex Couples Should Benefit from
the MeretriciousRelationship Doctrine

The Washington Supreme Court should apply the meretricious
relationship doctrine to same-sex couples because of public policy. The
Vasquez court denied an equitable remedy to a group of Washington
citizens. Public policy supports just applications of law, just remedies,
and the protection of Washington citizens.
Just application of the law requires that same-sex relationships be
eligible to qualify as meretricious relationships. Vasquez retains a right
for unmarried couples who have the choice to marry but denies it to
221. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999); Singer v. Hara, I I Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
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couples who do not have the choice to marry but may wish to do so.
Same-sex couples across the country desperately want to take advantage
of both the rights and obligations offered by marriage.222 Legislatures
have exercised their power to deny such legal benefits to same-sex
couples. 3 Vasquez punishes a group of Washington state citizens who
have already been excluded from the legal institution of marriage224 by
denying them a simple property remedy because of that legal status. If
the courts create a property doctrine for unmarried couples, that property
doctrine should justly apply to all unmarried couples, and not just
heterosexual couples who already have the benefit of legal marriage.
The court attempted to justify its decision by noting that Frank
Vasquez might seek relief under alternate theories;225 however, not all
parties to a same-sex relationship will be able to prove implied
partnership or constructive trust. Constructive trust has traditionally
required evidence of fraud, breach of fiduciary responsibility or contract,
or overreaching. 6 Implied partnership requires evidence of the intention
of the parties either by direct evidence or from the circumstances. 2 7 It
may be difficult for someone in Vasquez's position to prove such intent
where one partner is deceased. Under the meretricious relationship
doctrine, intent is just one of the factors a court may rely on to find a
meretricious relationship existed. 8
Nor are the remedies under the implied-partnership or constructivetrust theories just when compared to the property-distribution principles
of the meretricious relationship doctrine. Parties that could prove such
remedies as constructive trust or implied partnership do not have the
advantage of the presumptive one-half interest inherent in community
property principles 9 or the just and equitable division used under the
meretricious relationship doctrine."o Just and equitable division allows
222. See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d 44; Baker, 744 A.2d 864; Singer, 11 Wash. App. 246, 522 P.2d
1187.
223. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(c).
224. See id.
225. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 99 Wash. App. 363, 369, 994 P.2d 240, 243, review granted, 141
Wash. 2d 1025, 11 P.3d 825 (2000).
226. In re Thornton, 14 Wash. App. 397,402, 541 P.2d 1243, 1246-47 (1975).
227. Id. at 401, 541 P.2d at 1246 (citing Nicholson v. Kilbury, 83 Wash. 196, 202, 145 P. 189,
191-92 (1915)).
228. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995).
229. See supra Part I.A.
230. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 347, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995).
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courts to take into account the needs of the parties. 231 On the other hand,
remedies such as constructive trust are restitution remedies, and simply
restore the parties to the positions they formerly occupied. 232 For
example, under a restitution remedy Vasquez might receive the
equivalent of minimum wage for his labor in the bag business, but not
the presumptive one-half interest in the assets acquired during the
relationship that results when a couple has engaged in a marital-like
partnership.
Finally, Vasquez rewards the "cunning and the shrewd."23' 3 The
Washington Supreme Court specifically attacked the Creasman
presumption for rewarding the "cunning and the shrewd" who may hold
property in their name while acquiring it with an unmarried partner234
and later overturned the Creasman presumption.235 Vasquez reinstates
the Creasman presumption for same-sex couples, requiring them to
prove alternate contract or restitution theories. The meretricious
relationship doctrine should protect same-sex partners who may not
legally marry and may not possess the resources or legal knowledge to
create contractual property rights.
B.

The Vasquez Decision Is Heterosexist

Vasquez is a heterosexist decision because it holds that same-sex
relationships cannot be marital-like. Heterosexism differs from
homophobia. Homophobia implies an irrational fear and hatred of gay or
lesbian people.236 Heterosexism "is the systematic implementation,
through law, custom, and other vehicles, of the view that heterosexuality
is 'natural' and that lesbian and gay sexuality are morally and socially
inferior." 37 The Vasquez opinion reflects a belief that gay and lesbian
relationships are inferior to heterosexual ones.

231. See Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash. 2d 558, 566-67, 236 P.2d 1044, 1049-50 (1951) (citing
Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 223, 96 P. 1081, 1083 (1908) (awarding one-quarter of
property to ex-wife and innocent wife each and man one-half because man aged, feeble, and in
need of medical support)).
232. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § I cmt. a (1937); see also id. § 160.
233. West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 316, 311 P.2d 689, 693 (1957) (Finley, J., concurring).
234. Id.
235. Inre Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d 299, 304, 678 P.2d328, 331 (1984).
236. Rhondon Copelon, A Crime Not Fit to Be Named: Sex, Lies, and the Constitution, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 177, 191-92 n.2 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
237. Id.
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Vasquez represents a heterosexist assumption that gay and lesbian
couples are not capable of engaging in marital-like conduct. Vasquez
referred to the marriage statute prohibiting certain marriages in order to
hold that same-sex couples cannot exist in marital-like relationships,
drawing a bright-line for the first time in the history of the meretricious
relationship doctrine."8 The court thereby avoided a conduct-based
analysis of the term "marital-like."
By using the status-based construction of "marital-like," the court
assumed that status determines conduct. This is a false assumption. One
can easily imagine an opposite-sex couple legally married for
immigration reasons and acting both privately and publicly as if they are
not married; or, alternatively, a couple acting privately and publicly as if
they were married but not being legally married. This is also a false
assumption as it applies to same-sex couples. Gay and lesbian couples
can and do engage in marital-like relationships, holding commitment
ceremonies, raising children, and staying together until death.2 9 Their
status in society does not ultimately determine their ability to engage in
such relationships.
Vasquez and Schwerzler's relationship was an example of a
meretricious relationship. A relationship must be stable and marital-like
in order to be a meretricious relationship.240 By analyzing the duration
and continuity of their cohabitation,24' it is evident that Vasquez and
Schwerzler had a stable relationship, as Vasquez and Schwerzler
cohabited without interruption for twenty-eight years.242 Furthermore,
their conduct exemplified a marital-like relationship. Vasquez and
Schwerzler mutually supported each other in a familial and business
context, had an intent to form such a supportive relationship, and they
pooled their resources.243
Neither state nor federal laws prevent heterosexist decisions by the
courts. The court in Singer declined to extend Washington's Equal
2 45
Rights Amendment2 4 to provide marriage rights to same-sex couples.
238. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 99 Wash. App. 363, 367-68, 994 P.2d 240, 242-43, review
granted, 141 Wash. 2d 1025, 11 P.3d 825 (2000).
239. See Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Vows: Marriage Ceremonies for
Same-Sex Couples, at http://www.buddybuddy.comflvows.html (last visited Apr. 7,2001).
240. Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash. 2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (1995).
241. See supra Part II.A.
242. Vasquez, 99 Wash. App. at 364,994 P.2d at 241.
243. See supra Part III.A.
244. WASH. CONST. art. 31 §1.
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The supreme court has not labeled gays, lesbians, and bisexuals a
protected class for the purposes of federal equal protection.246 Until
federal equal protection includes gays, lesbians, and bisexuals as a
protected class, or Washington's Equal Rights Amendment is interpreted
to prohibit the denial of same-sex marriage, Vasquez represents a kind of
decision that courts are technically free to make.
Reality, however, requires that the Washington Supreme Court
recognize that gay and lesbian couples can and do engage in marital-like
conduct. Justice, therefore, demands that same-sex couples be offered
the limited protections of the meretricious relationship doctrine.
Precedent, 4 ' an interpretation of the statute prohibiting certain
marriages, 2448 the intent and purpose of the meretricious relationship
doctrine,2 49 and public policy2 50 support a conduct-based definition of
marital-like that can and should apply to same-sex couples.
Creasman ignored the social realities of an interracial couple in 1948
and promulgated a presumption steeped in racism; Vasquez reinstates
the Creasmanpresumption for same-sex couples because of heterosexist
bias. The court should not impose the regressive Creasmanpresumption
on same-sex couples. Rather, the court should remember what it said
while admonishing lower courts' application of the Creasman
presumption in the pre-Lindsey era: "Property rights are not determined
on the basis of social relationships, moral or immoral. 25'
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1948, the Washington Supreme Court ignored the social realities of
an interracial couple and promulgated the Creasman presumption,
holding that property acquired by an unmarried couple must belong to
the one who holds title. For years, courts noted the injustice of this rule
and created numerous exceptions. Finally, the Washington Supreme
245. Singer v. Hara, II Wash. App. 246, 250-52, 258-60, 522 P.2d 1187, 1190-91, 1194-95

(1974).
246. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986). It is arguable that denying the
meretricious relationship doctrine to same-sex couples violates the Fourteenth Amendment under
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). This Note does not reach this constitutional issue.
247. See supra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 208-21 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 222-35 and accompanying text.
251. Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wash. 2d 627, 630, 305 P.2d 805, 807 (1957).
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Court recognized the need for a property doctrine that would equitably
divide the property of unmarried couples upon the termination of their
relationships, overruled the Creasman presumption, and created the
meretricious relationship doctrine. In Vasquez, Washington took a step
backward by withholding that doctrine from same-sex couples. By
ignoring the social realities of same-sex couples, the Vasquez court
denied to Frank Vasquez what a court would have given to a woman in
his place, and it assumed that because same-sex couples may not be
legally married, same-sex couples cannot engage in marital-like conduct.
The Washington Supreme Court should reverse Vasquez and hold that
"marital-like" is determined by conduct and not by legal status. The
previous application of "marital-like," the plain language and history of
the marriage statute prohibiting certain marriages, the intent and purpose
of the meretricious relationship doctrine, public policy, and the need to
combat heterosexist bias support such a holding. Moreover, same-sex
couples can and do engage in marital-like conduct, just as Frank
Vasquez and Robert Schwerzler did.
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